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Why Did Plato Write
Socratic Dialogues?
William J. Prior

I Introduction
The reader will discern in the title of this paper a reference to a classic
article by Charles Kahn.1 In this article and in a number that have
followed,2 Kahn has criticized the dominant contemporary interpretation of Plato's early dialogues and suggested an alternative of his own.
I do not think Kahn's positive views are correct;3 however, I think he
succeeds completely in showing what is wrong with the standard interpretation of the early dialogues. He does not show, in other words, what
Plato's motives were for writing his early dialogues; but he certainly
shows what were not Plato's motives. In what follows I shall build on
Kahn's critique in order to pave the way for a statement of my own
positive account of the nature and purpose of the early Platonic dialogues.

1 Kahn (1981)
2 For a list, see the Bibliography.
3 Kahn has been criticized by Mark McPherran. See also Kahn's response, in his
(1991).
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II Methodological Preliminaries; the Historical Approach
The business of scholars of ancient philosophy is interpretation. That is,
it is our job to bring out the meaning of ancient philosophical texts.
Interpretation begins when we bring questions to these texts. The interpretation we produce depends in large part on the questions we ask.
Many interpreters of ancient texts have aims that are primarily historical;
that is, they seek information about the philosophical views of historical
figures. Interpreters seeking information about the philosophical views
of the historical Socrates must come to Plato's early dialogues with that
question in mind.4 That is, they must view these dialogues as a source of
historical data; and if they are viewed in that light, some very predictable
questions about the evidential reliability of the early Platonic dialogues
naturally arise.
A scholarly consensus has developed that these reliability questions
can be answered positively, and thus that the early Platonic dialogues
provide material for the reconstruction of the philosophical views of the
historical Socrates.51 shall attempt to show that this consensus is unjustified below. For the present, let me note that this historical approach not
only demands that we view the early dialogues as a source of historical
data, but also strongly suggests that at least one of Plato's aims in writing
them was the preservation of the historical Socrates' views. This in turn
suggests that we should think of Plato, whatever else he may have been,
as Socrates' biographer.

Ill The Biographical Hypothesis
An extreme version of this interpretive hypothesis can be found in the
work of Burnet and Taylor in the early decades of this century.6 Burnet
and Taylor thought that Plato was so faithful to the philosophy of his
master, Socrates, that he only represented the character of the dialogues

4 This question was the object of Gregory Vlastos' investigation in his (1991); see esp.
Ch.2.
5 Cf. e.g., Terry Penner (124).
6 See for instance the introduction to John Burnet (1911); Chs. 8 and 9 of his (1914);
the first chapter of A.E. Taylor (1933); and his (1917-1918,93 ff.).
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as holding views that the historical Socrates held, and reserved the
expression of his own philosophical theories to characters such as the
Eleatic Stranger. The merit of this radical view was that it at least
provided a consistent analysis of the character Socrates: we could be
sure, if Bumet and Taylor were right, that when Socrates spoke in the
dialogues it was the thought of the historical figure that was expressed.
The major defect of the interpretation was that it required the attribution
of the Platonic Theory of Forms and related doctrines in epistemology
and psychology to the historical Socrates; and this seemed so implausible
and inconsistent with our other historical evidence that virtually no
scholar has found the Taylor-Burnet view acceptable.7
In place of the extreme position held by Bumet and Taylor, recent
scholars have defended a more moderate version of the biographical
hypothesis. On this version only the early dialogues give us the historical
Socrates; the middle dialogues give us Plato. In Gregory Vlastos' particular formulation of this hypothesis the doctrines of the historical
Socrates portrayed in the early dialogues are strictly incompatible with
the doctrines defended by the Socrates of the middle dialogues; this is
one of the things that enables us to distinguish the views of Plato (those
attributed to Socrates in the middle dialogues) from those of the historical Socrates (those attributed to Socrates in the early dialogues).8 Many
scholars who don't agree with everything Vlastos says, including this
claim about the strict incompatibility of the early and middle dialogues,
do however, agree that the early dialogues give us a picture of the
historical Socrates, and that it was Plato's intention to do so.

IV Critique of the Biographical Hypothesis
This interpretive approach, as Penner has indicated, represents a
consensus among contemporary scholars of Socrates writing in the
mainstream of British and American scholarship. According to Kahn,

7 The Taylor-Bumet view is a striking example of how our interpretation of the early
Platonic dialogues can be decisively shaped by an assumption (in this case Plato's
historical fastidiousness) the interpreters bring to the text. It ought to serve as a
lesson in restraint when we seek to apply our own, more currently fashionable
assumptions, to the interpretation of the early dialogues.
8 (1991), Ch. 2
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'all the best scholarship in Greek philosophy in the last 150 years'9 has
been characterized by this approach (except of course for his own). It
faces, however, three difficulties, none of which it can solve and each
of which is sufficient to raise doubt about its viability. The first is that
we lack the independent, objective evidence about the philosophical
views of Socrates needed to confirm the accuracy of Plato's portrait in
the early dialogues. Our other sources from the period are flawed:
Xenophon had his own interests, some of which he attributed to
Socrates in his works, may not have been all that closely acquainted
with Socrates, and certainly lacked Plato's philosophical acumen; the
independence of Aristotle's testimony from that of Plato is questionable,10 and few take the portrait of Socrates in Aristophanes' Clouds to
be a serious source of information about the historical Socrates. We lack
any direct evidence about Socrates' philosophical views that is not
mediated by the viewpoint of another thinker. All scholars can do is
attempt to triangulate from these flawed and often incompatible
portraits to the genuine views of the historical Socrates, and this effort,
when adjustments are made for evidentiary weight, looks much more
like informed guesswork than science. In such an attempt the vividness,
philosophical interest, and artistic power of the early Platonic dialogues
almost inevitably produce in the reader a conviction of their historical
accuracy that can't be justified on objective grounds. As Kahn notes,
The historicist reading of the Socratic dialogues seems to be due to a
kind of optical illusion produced by Plato's uncanny gift for creating
lifelike pictures of the past. But this reading commits the straightforward fallacy of treating fourth-century works of dramatic fiction as if
they were historical documents from the fifth century."

9 (1988c),99
10 For a critique of Aristotle's account of Socratic philosophy see Kahn (1992 [235-8])
and John Beversluis (1993 [298-301]). Beversluis also offers criticism of Vlastos' use
of Xenophon as a source for the philosophy of the historical Socrates.
11 (1988b),35
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We believe we are seeing the historical Socrates through the medium
of the dialogue, when what we are actually seeing is the creative work
of a great artist and philosopher.
The second difficulty with the biographical hypothesis is that it
presents an implausible picture of Plato's artistic and philosophical
development. In brief, it makes Plato a philosophical acolyte and
intellectual historian until his mid-forties, after which he blossoms as
an original philosopher. Kahn asks, 'Is it plausible to assume that a
philosopher with the unrivaled creative powers of Plato could remain
fixed in a single philosophical position, that of his master, for 12 or
more years after the master's death?'12 The fact that needs explaining
here is the sudden, dramatic emergence of Plato as a philosopher at
the time of the middle dialogues. During his years as a faithful
biographer of Socrates was he secretly developing his own philosophical skills and theories, but refraining from committing them to writing?
Or did he become discontented with the role of biographer in mid-life
and branch off on his own? Neither view does justice to an intuition
that cannot fail to grip any philosophically minded reader of the earlier
dialogues: that the author of these works, and not just the main
character, is a great philosopher.
The third difficulty is that the biographical hypothesis can't explain
why Plato chose Socrates as the spokesman for both the Socratic
philosophy of the early dialogues and the Platonic philosophy of the
middle dialogues. This problem is particularly acute for those who
think, like Vlastos, that the doctrines of the early and middle dialogues
are incompatible, but it is a real problem for all who think (and who
doesn't?) that the doctrines of the middle dialogues go beyond those
of the early period. On the biographical hypothesis, Plato must have
abandoned the attempt to represent the views of the historical Socrates
at a certain point, either without being aware of what he was doing
or being aware of it but not informing the reader of his change of
intention. I think he was too good a philosopher to be unaware that
the philosophical theory of Phaedo 95-107, say, was significantly different from anything in the Apology, and I think he was too good an artist
to fail to bring a shift of focus of that sort to the reader's attention.
(Note in this respect how he uses new main characters in the later

12 (1992), 239
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dialogues, such as Parmenides, Timaeus and the Eleatic Stranger, to
introduce new perspectives. The obvious question to ask is, why not
do so in the middle dialogues?)13
One may, of course, for all I have said, interpret the early dialogues
in light of the biographical hypothesis. One might attempt to justify this
approach by the light it sheds on this group of dialogues as a whole, or
on individual dialogues in particular. But what one cannot do, in light
of Kahn's criticism of this hypothesis, is to treat this hypothesis as the
obviously correct or necessary approach to the early dialogues.
V An Alternative Approach
In view of the difficulties faced by the biographical approach to the
Socratic dialogues, we ought to welcome an alternative. From my remarks above, the ruling principles of that alternative should be clear. If
Plato is not recalling the conversations of the historical Socrates, then he
is composing original works of philosophy, and doing so with an artistic
ability so great that it creates the illusion of historicity. Kahn and Vlastos
agree that the early dialogues are works of philosophy; they disagree
only on whether or not they are works of 'Socratic' philosophy. Kahn
states, 'The dialogues belong to Plato and to the fourth century. So do
the doctrines and arguments contained in them. Even where the inspiration of Socrates is clear, the dialogues are all Platonic.'141 agree with
this judgment. We need not deny that the inspiration for the character
Socrates in the early dialogues is the historical Socrates, or that the
philosophical conversation in them is influenced by him, but we ought
not to expect to separate the Socratic elements in these dialogues from
the Platonic. We should not, therefore, approach the early dialogues
primarily seeking answers to questions about the historical Socrates.
Instead, let us place the author of the dialogues, and not 'the ambiguous
figure [who is] at once Plato's historical master and his literary puppet/15
at center stage.

13 Vlastos attempts to answer this question in his (1988 [109]); his answer, that Plato
shared a moral project with Socrates, goes only part of the way to solving the
problem.
14 (1981), 320
15 Ibid., 305. Note in this connection a remark made over a century ago by George
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I start by assuming, with Kahn, that Plato is both a creative philosopher and a master stylist from the start of his career. The questions I want
to ask are:
What was Plato attempting to do in his dialogues?
Why did he write dialogues?
What role does he assign Socrates to play in these dialogues?
I shall attempt to answer each of these questions in rum, beginning with
the last question and proceeding to the first (the reason for this order
becoming clear, as I hope, as we proceed). Before I begin, however, let
me note that it will be my aim to offer an account that applies not just to
the early dialogues, but to the middle dialogues as well; indeed, to all
the dialogues in which Socrates is the primary speaker. Kahn remarks
that:
There could be no objection to the term "Socratic dialogue" if it meant
simply to refer to dialogues in which Socrates is the principal speaker.
In that case it would refer to the Phaedo and the Republic as well, in fact
to all of Plato's writings before the Parmenides and Sophist. But that is
not how the term is used. It always refers to dialogues earlier than the
Symposium-Phaedo ..."

Like Kahn, I do not want to depart from common usage; but, as I think
there is a single hypothesis that explains Plato's choice of Socrates as
chief speaker wherever he plays that role, I shall in fact be concerned
with all the dialogues that Kahn says might unproblematically be called
'Socratic'.
Let me also note that the following account will be necessarily programmatic. It is in fact a sketch for a larger project on the nature of the
dialogues in which I am currently engaged. For reasons of space much
of the presentation of evidence necessary to make the project plausible
must be omitted here.

Grote: 'We continually read from the pen of the expositor such remarks as these —
"Mark how Plato puts down the shallow and worthless Sophist" — the obvious
reflection, that it is Plato himself who plays both games on the chess-board, being
altogether overlooked' (1883 [164-5]).
16 (1988b),33
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VI The Role of Socrates
What interests most non-specialist readers in the early and middle
dialogues is the character of Socrates. They are not primarily attracted
to his doctrines and arguments, which are often difficult and counter-intuitive, but to the fact that he lives out his convictions. Philosophy, for
Socrates in these dialogues, is a way of life. In the dialogues written
before the Parmenides, Socrates is the only representative of that way of
life. Of the characters Socrates meets in the early and middle dialogues,
none is a philosopher. These characters fall into three categories: ordinary people, political types, and professional teachers (sophists and
rhetoricians). Some, such as Glaucon and Adeimantus in the Republic,
are interested in and perhaps attracted to the life of philosophy; others,
such as Simmias and Cebes in the Phaedo, may have entered upon the
path of a philosophical life; but only Socrates qualifies as a full-fledged
exemplar of a life dedicated to philosophy and lived in accordance with
its principles.
When we see a feature repeatedly displayed in a group of dialogues,
it seems fair to assume that it is not accidental, but that Plato put it there
deliberately. It follows that Plato intended to portray Socrates as the
exemplification of the philosophical life. Socrates is philosophy for Plato
in these dialogues. It follows further that Plato's interest in Socrates was
philosophical, not historical; he is using the character Socrates to depict
the nature of the philosophical life, not to portray the views of the
historical Socrates. Now it is obvious that the historical Socrates was the
inspiration for this literary portrait; however, on my interpretation we
need not even ask the historical question whether a particular doctrine
or argument represents the view of the historical Socrates.

VII Why Did Plato Write Dialogues?
If Socrates is Plato's representation of the philosophical life, if that is his
role in the dialogues (and thus the answer to the third of the three
questions I posed above), why did Plato choose to depict him in dialogues,
that is in conversations with others? Obviously, given what I have said
so far, I can't simply rely on the answer that the biographical hypothesis
would give: that this was the way the historical Socrates actually philosophized.
To discover an answer to this question we must do what defenders of
the dramatic interpretation of the dialogues have long been asking us to
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do: we must look at Socrates' interlocutors. As I noted above, Socrates'
interlocutors in the early and middle dialogues are non-philosophers.
Notoriously, none of the interlocutors succeeds in understanding what
Socrates is about; the early dialogues end in failure, and although Socrates in the middle dialogues attains philosophical knowledge his interlocutors follow him at best imperfectly.17 They cannot enter into the
Socratic conversation because they do not understand principles and
values that underlie the philosophical life.
The interlocutors don't fail because they are stupid, though commentators often allege this. Plato was not interested in writing works that
simply made fun of foolish views and the persons who held them. In
particular, Plato portrays Protagoras as Socrates' intellectual equal
throughout that dialogue, and he takes the views of Callicles and Thrasymachus very seriously as alternatives to his own. The dialogues are
genuine debates between competing visions of life. The interlocutors fail
to understand Socrates because they are committed to lives incompatible
in principle with philosophy (though Socrates only talks with those who
express an interest in virtue).
Since the failure of the interlocutors is so regular, we must believe that
it is an intentional feature of the dialogues; Plato wanted us to see and
reflect on this. The dialogues are unhappy encounters between the philosopher and non-philosophers, and the point of the encounters is to show
the incompatibility between the life of philosophy and that lived by
non-philosophers. Perhaps the best example of the unhappy encounter
is the Apology. It is often said that the Apology isn't really a dialogue,18 for

17 Kahn notes (1988c [85]) that not all the early dialogues end in aporia; he cites the
Crito as an example of an early dialogue with a positive conclusion. But though Crito
at the end of the dialogue is no longer able to oppose Socrates, the reader feels that
this is not so much because he has fully grasped Socrates' argument as because he
has been overwhelmed by Socrates' rhetoric, and in particular the speech of the
Laws. For examples of the imperfect comprehension of the interlocutors to the
presentation of philosophical knowledge in the middle dialogues, see e.g., Phaedo
76b (where Simmias states that only Socrates, among men then living, could give
an adequate account of the Forms), and Republic ΥΠ, 533a, where Socrates tells
Glaucon he will be unable to follow the account of dialectic and its apprehension of
the Good. In the Symposium it is Diotima who plays the role of the expositor of
philosophical doctrine, and, ironically, Socrates to whom the role of uncomprehending interlocutor is assigned (209e-10a).
18 E.g., by Kahn (1981 [307]).
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it contains only a brief passage of argumentative give and take with
Meletus. In fact, however, the Apology is a dialectical interchange between Socrates and the people of Athens. Socrates presents the philosophical underpinnings of his life, from his profession of ignorance to
his belief that virtue trumps all other goods to his claim that the life
without inquiry is not worth living, and the jury responds with about as
much understanding as Cassandra's hearers do to her prophecies. The
Apology displays on a large scale the incomprehension of ordinary
people when faced with Socrates, and the consequences of that incomprehension.
Not all of those who speak with Socrates reject his views. Crito accepts
Socrates' arguments, as does Agathon in the Symposium. Simmias and
Cebes and Glaucon and Adeimantus are favorably disposed to Socrates.
None of these interlocutors, however, displays the understanding of
Socrates' life that would mark them as philosophers in their own right.
In the early and middle dialogues, I think, there is only one speaker who
shows a real appreciation of what Socrates was about; and that is
Alcibiades in the Symposium. Alcibiades' speech illustrates vividly the
tension felt by someone bright enough to be attracted to the life of
Socratic philosophy but unable to resist the allure of political power.
Alcibiades records the reaction of every serious philosophical reader to
Socrates' arguments: they 'turned my whole soul upside down and
made me feel as if I were the lowest of the low' (215e; Joyce, trans.) When
I listen to Socrates, says Alcibiades, 'he makes me admit that while I'm
spending my time on politics I am neglecting all the things that are crying
for attention in myself' (216a). This is of course the message Socrates puts
forward in the Apology and other early dialogues, and it is clearly Plato's
intention to depict Alcibiades in this passage as one who has received
that message and been convinced by it.
Yet the encounter between Alcibiades and Socrates was not, despite
Alcibiades' understanding of Socrates' message, a happy one. It was
in fact the unhappiest encounter of all. For Alcibiades (and here I am
referring to the character in the Symposium, not necessarily the historical
figure) found a response to Socrates that Socrates apparently had not
anticipated. Convinced by Socrates' arguments but unable to abandon
politics, Alcibiades simply refuses to listen to Socrates (216a). His
response is one of moral weakness: Ί know I ought to do the things
he tells me to, and yet the moment I'm out of his sight I don't care
what I do to keep in with the mob' (216b). This produces in him a
sense of shame (216c) but no philosophical conversion. Alcibiades is a
living refutation of the psychology of the early dialogues, according
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to which knowledge is sufficient for virtue and moral weakness is
impossible. I suspect that it was Platonic reflection on Alcibiades'
failure that led Plato to the more sophisticated psychology of the
Republic and to the conviction that reform of the governmental structure
of the state was necessary to ensure that the Alcibiadeses of the world
made proper use of their philosophical gifts.

VIII What was Plato Attempting to do in his Dialogues?
If all of the dialogues record unhappy encounters between Socrates and
various interlocutors, and if it was Plato's intention that they do so, then
we have an answer to our second question. Plato wrote dialogues, I
suggest, to depict the incommensurability between Socrates' philosophical conception of life and the other conceptions that predominated in
classical Athens (as they do in North America today). But in order to
depict unhappy encounters one must know what a happy encounter
would be like. One must understand what the philosophical life, as
depicted by Socrates in the dialogues, is about, be convinced of its
superiority to other lives, and (unlike Alcibiades) form a firm desire to
live it. I suggest that Plato saw his own encounter with Socrates as a
happy one, perhaps the only happy one with which he was familiar;
Plato thought that he, and perhaps he alone, understood and wanted to
live the philosophical life exemplified by Socrates.
It follows from this that Plato saw Socrates and himself as engaged in
the same fundamental project: the project of living philosophically. That
means that Plato would identify with the aims expressed by Socrates in
the early and middle dialogues; his attitude toward them would be that
of a fellow devotee of the philosophical life, not that of a reporter. As a
devotee, Plato would be concerned that the attitudes, beliefs, arguments
and conclusions expressed by Socrates in the dialogues be those that best
captured the nature of the philosophical life, not necessarily the views
of the historical Socrates about the nature of that life.
But Plato, as a philosopher (that is, as one who is concerned with
the philosophical life and how to live it), was not solely interested in
depicting the philosophical life, as personified by Socrates, and contrasting that life with other types of life; he was also interested in
defending the superiority of the philosophical life to all other lives. It
is for this reason that we cannot view the dialogues as dramas, and
Plato as a philosophical dramatist. A dramatist would be content with
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bringing the philosophical life into conflict with other lives, but Plato's
aims go beyond this.
Plato's philosophical aims are twofold: to describe the life of philosophy, and to argue for its superiority to other lives. Often the description
occurs in the context of justification, as in Socrates' famous remark at
Apology 38a: 'the greatest good for man is to fashion philosophical
arguments each day about virtue and the other things you hear me
discussing, when I examine myself and others,... the unexamined life is
not for man worth living.' Justification of the philosophical life takes two
forms. The aim of the first is to show that only the philosophical life is
worth living, as the passage just quoted states. The second form is more
moderate in its aims: it aims only to show that the philosophical life is
better than other lives. This latter aim is pursued in the Republic.

IX The Early and the Middle Dialogues
In this penultimate section of the paper I want briefly to address the
sharp distinction many scholars draw between the early and middle
dialogues. I regret that my remarks here will be particularly sketchy in
a paper that is already highly programmatic.
Though the doctrines and arguments attributed to Socrates do change
as we move from the early to the middle dialogues, the attempt to justify
the philosophical life is a unifying theme in both sets of dialogues. The
philosophical life is the pursuit of wisdom. This pursuit can only be
justified if there is such a thing as wisdom and if it is attainable by human
beings. If truth is subjective, or relative, or out of reach of human beings,
Socrates' life is a vain pursuit (though one with a certain integrity
nonetheless).
The Apology indicates that there are two sorts of wisdom: that possessed by the gods and that possessed by humans. Socrates' success at
the elenchus indicates to him that no human possesses divine wisdom,
but he doesn't actually say that he thinks it impossible for humans to
possess such wisdom. The ancient Greeks would not have seen the view
that some humans possessed at least some of the wisdom of the gods as
puzzling; their literature abounded with cases of communication between the gods and humans and the common account of poetic creativity
presupposed communion between the poet and the Muses.
My general view about the doctrinal developments of the early and
middle dialogues is that they result from Plato's meditations on the
distinction of the Apology between divine and human wisdom. In this
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distinction, I would argue, we find the germ (but only the germ) of the
metaphysics of the middle dialogues.19 The distinction between the
eternal, intelligible world of being and the temporal, phenomenal world
of becoming seems designed to reflect that distinction. The Doctrine of
Recollection seems designed to explain how the philosopher can transcend the limits of human wisdom and attain the divine. The Theory of
Forms does not merely offer an account of objective truth, but underlies
a positive account of the nature of wisdom.
The salient metaphysical and epistemological doctrines of the middle
dialogues are thus answers to questions that arise when one attempts to
justify the philosophical life. The middle dialogues, with their characteristically Platonic doctrines, are thus not opposed to the early dialogues; they grow naturally out of the project of the early dialogues, and
in fact contain solutions to problems that the project gives rise to.
I do not claim that Plato had the solutions to these problems in mind
when he wrote the Apology; I am not defending a Unitarian approach to
the dialogues. Nor do I want to defend the view of Kahn that the early
dialogues are to be read proleptically. There is plenty in each early
dialogue to engage us without our needing to refer each argument in it
to a corresponding argument in the middle dialogues. I do want to
defend, however, the continuity between the questions raised in the
early dialogues and the answers offered in the middle period works. The
middle dialogues represent, not a radically new view of philosophy, as
Vlastos would have it, but a series of Platonic solutions to problems
raised in the early dialogues, and in particular the problem of the nature
and attainability of wisdom.

X Conclusion

In conclusion, let me summarize my thesis. It is that we may most
profitably view the Platonic dialogues in which Socrates plays a prominent role not as historically accurate studies in philosophical biography,
but as Plato's attempt to depict, describe and justify the life of philosophy

19 Kahn makes a similar point when he notes that 'Platonic metaphysics and epistemology can be thought of as Plato's answer to the question. What kind of knowledge
is required for the success of the Socratic elenchus?' (1988a [549]).
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by placing the philosopher, in the person of Socrates, in dialectical
confrontation with those defending other lives. Plato's aim in writing
dialogues, from the earliest compositions on, was not historical, but
philosophical. The early and middle dialogues form an extended meditation on the nature of the philosophical life; and, though the metaphysical, epistemological and psychological underpinnings of the portrait of
the philosophical life offered in the Republic are not present in the
Apology, the portrait itself is recognizable as a direct descendant of the
portrait in that earlier work.
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